Historical accuracy is something that most ASL players demand. This, I think, is due to the fact that most of us are history buffs, and were attracted to the game because of its detail and the fact that playing the game teaches us quite a bit about World War II. Just flipping through Chapter H is like perusing one of the better encyclopedias of World War II military equipment.

This demand for historical accuracy is reflected in scenario design. I am a scenario designer myself (shameless plug: play A109 "Scouts Out", J60 "Bad Luck", or scenarios 1 through 4 in CH's Total East Front Pack!). This means that I know that most of the fun involved is digging up the facts about the battle being portrayed. As a player, it's fun to know that the scenario being played is a fair representation of the actual forces that really fought. Although minor details will certainly be missed, we want the designers to be as accurate as possible, otherwise it just doesn't "feel right". Furthermore, since it is true that many players use ASL as a way to learn details about World War II, I feel that designers have an obligation to get it right.

Historical ASL (HASL) therefore represents the ultimate in historical accuracy. HASL modules are explicit attempts to recreate a battle as closely as possible. Here the details do matter, right down to what types of vehicles were used ("were they M4A1 or M4A3 Shermans?"), the times when certain units arrived at the scene, and what the terrain and environment was like. With detailed representations of the opposing forces and a map that nearly exactly re-creates the site of the battle, HASL takes realism and historical accuracy to a new level.

Despite this heightened attention to detail, HASL modules are not error-free. MMP made mistakes regarding the types of British tanks in their Pegasus Bridge module. MMP also came under fire when they allowed the Germans in A Bridge Too Far to buy King Tiger reinforcement groups, when evidence of those tanks actually having been in Arnhem is largely non-existent. Some players have also wondered about not being able to purchase any OT-34s as the Russians in Red Barricades, even though they are known to have been a part of the battle (and indeed are represented in several scenarios). Thus, we have historical inaccuracies in precisely the areas of our game where we most definitely should not. This is annoying, and it defeats the purpose of the "H" in HASL. Furthermore, it misleads people who are (rightly or wrongly) using HASL modules to learn details about specific battles.

This essay turns a critical eye to the recently-translated Kursk HASL by Tactiques, called "Stalnie Prostori" ("Plains of Steel"), hereafter designated SP. This is available at the Coastal Fortress website as a free download. Why this particular HASL? I've always been interested in the Battle(s) of Kursk, and have read as much as possible on the subject. I have patiently waited to get my hands on a HASL on the subject. Now I have two: "SP" from Tactiques and "Hell's Bridgehead" (HB) from Critical Hit. So, as soon as my printer finally spat out the last page of SP I eagerly began reading through it. As I read more and more, I became more and more disappointed. It seems that the designers have bought into the myths of the Battle of Prokhorovka lock, stock and barrel.

There are many myths surrounding the 1943 German offensive in the Kursk salient. One of the greatest myths concerns the Battle of Prokhorovka, where conventional wisdom states "the largest tank battle in history took place." Although there was indeed combat near Prokhorovka, it most definitely was not in the form that most people envision.

The battle near Prokhorovka was not fought between nearly 2000 tanks as some sources claim. Traditional western sources, based on flawed Soviet accounts, wildly overestimate German tank, assault gun, and tank destroyer strength at 600. Examples of western authors that have been duped by Russian sources such as the general staff study and Rotmistrov's (the commanding officer of the 5^th Guards Tank Army) account include prominent scholars of history such as Albert Seaton and David Glantz. The Soviet general staff study of Kursk for example, states that total AFV losses at Prokhorovka on both sides was on the order of 1200. Considering that significantly less than half that number were even engaged in battle between Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and 5^th Guards Tank Army (the two main combatants near Prokhorovka), this is ridiculous. In fact, the Germans, in their 3 divisions that fought in the vicinity (the SS Panzergrenadier divisions Totenkopf, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler-LSSAH, and Das Reich) could barely field 300 tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers at the time (July 10, 11 and 12). Furthermore, only the LSSAH really fought in the Battle of Prokhorovka; Das Reich was far to the south, and Totenkopf was fighting its own seperate battle in a bridgehead across the Psel. The Soviets probably fielded over 1000 tanks and assault guns, as significant percentage of which were obsolete T-70s and the crummy SU-76; this includes formations of the 5^th Guards Tank Army and the 5^th Guards Army.

So, although the fighting was fierce and a large number of AFV were involved, it certainly was not the battle that most people think took place. Furthermore, most of the "battle" was a series of distinct attacks, counterattacks, and disengagements involving separate and distinct units, often very far apart from each other. There was not one big swirling, running, 3-day tank battle as the popularized accounts portray. For sure, the 3 German divisions were each fighting quite separate battles, and so the "largest tank battle in the world" that SP represents only concerns one division, the LSSAH, which on July 11^th (the start of the SP CG) could put only 103 tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers into battle. Of these 103, 20 were the poorly armored Marder III which can barely be classified as an AFV. Interestingly, the LSSAH rattled into the battle with more Pz I's and Pz II's than Tigers. On July 11^th, there were only 4 Tigers available for combat, while there were 2 Pz I's and 4 Pz II's ready to go.

On the Russian side, the entire 5^th Guards Tank Army was able to field about 800 tanks. However, not all of these were positioned to engage the LSSAH at the doorstep of Prokhorovka. Only the 29^th Tank Corps, and the 18^th Tank Corps did battle with the LSSAH on July 11^th and 12^th. The 2^nd Guards Tank Corps was significantly further south, doing battle with Das Reich. 2^nd Tank Corps was positioned defensively just behind 29^th Tank Corps and stayed in a defensive posture for the course of the battle. 9^th Guards Airborne Division participated in the battle, but had no tanks. 5^th Guards Motorized Corps had a significant number of tanks, but was in reserve and remained there until after the Soviets went on the counter-offensive. So, the 5^th Guards Tank Army brought about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns to the battle with LSSAH, counting the 2^nd Tank Corps which didn't even engage on July 11 and 12.

The myth that the Germans fielded huge quantities of tanks and a lot of tigers was born because Soviet commanders had to justify their horrible losses. They had been crushed by a small force of average or crummy AFVs and needed to "beef up" the German forces so that their own losses became more reasonable. These distortions have crept into nearly every history of Kursk written prior to the mid-1990s when better data became available.

Now that some of the general myths about Kursk have been dealt with, there are many specific problems with SP that need to be brought to light. Many of these problems stem from the myths discussed above.

First, the Weather, EC, and Footnote 11 are incorrect. The weather on both July 11 and 12 in this area was reported by the LSSAH division as "heavy downpours, which severely hampered combat operations". Furthermore, the division reported that "roads [are] in very poor shape". The days preceding the battle portrayed in the CG were also rainy. The afternoon of July 9 was reported as "dreary and rainy" and July 10 had "heavy showers which hampered division's movements." In fact, the rains were so hard that on the 13^th the division reported that supply was becoming a problem and that by the 15^th the roads were "bottomless and unpassable". Yet the initial scenario has EC as Dry, with Clear skies. It should be overcast and raining for both July 11 and 12. Better yet, since air support did occur on July 11 and 12, I suggest something along the lines of the weather SSR used in Critical Hit's "Hell's Bridgehead". This allows air support to be used until it starts to rain. If the rain stops, air support can be used again. And although I'm not sure why the rule was put in, SP Special Rule 9 does prohibit road movement rate for vehicles; although I bet it isn't in there because of a concern for muddy roads (after all, the EC are dry) it actually works historically.

Second, Footnote 18 regarding the supremacy of Soviet artillery is incorrect. This leads to Russian OBA RGs that are too cheap and German OBA RGs that are far too expensive. A quick display of the artillery and rocket ammunition expenditures will make my point. On July 11 and 12, the two dates of the SP CG (and the main two days of the battle), LSSAH used 542 tons of conventional ammunition and 1 ton of rocket ammunition. Conventional expenditures by the 18^th and 29^th Tank Corps for those days against the LSSAH totaled just 35 tons, with another 102 tons fired by 9^th Guards Airborne Division. 18^th and 29^th Tank Corps used 68 tons of rocket ammunition. 2^nd Guards Tank Corps did not use any artillery or rocket ammunition. So, the Soviet fired 205 tons against LSSAH on July 11 and 12. This is only 38% of the ammunition used by LSSAH. One thing that escapes many people who read about this battle is that all of the Soviet forces in the area had just spend several days marching to their locations and had only been in position for a day, or even less. There simply was no time for the Russians to deploy their artillery assets. So, in the CG, the Germans should be able to buy OBA relatively cheaply and frequently while the Soviets should have few opportunities to buy OBA, and it should be expensive.

This particular battle aside, the German artillery and rocket forces consistently out-shot the Russians during the entire Battle of Kursk. Specifically: "German artillery consumption peaked on 5 July when they expended almost six times as much tonnage as the Soviets. Soviet artillery expenditures peaked on 12 July. Over the 5-18 July period, the German artillery consumed an average 1,700 tons/day, while the Soviets averaged only 500 tons/day. German rocket consumption peaked on 11 July at 970 tons. Soviet rocket expenditures peaked on 5 July at 280 tons. Over the 5-18 July period, the German rocket consumption averaged 394 tons/day, much more than the Soviet average of only 160 tons/day" (from the Kursk Operation Simulation And Validation Exercise - Phase II, 1998).

Third, German Note A1 is incorrect. The LSSAH did not have any Pz IIIN tanks during the Battle of Kursk. Force returns for July 1, 1943 show 13 available Pz III mostly armed with the 50L (some were armed with the shorter 50mm gun). At the start of the battle on July 5^th, this number was increased to 20. By the time LSSAH was engaged with the 5^th Guards Tank Army, it was down to 12 operational Pz IIIs (not including its 8 operational Pz III command/observer tanks). So, the Germans should not be able to buy Pz IIIN tanks, but should be able to buy Pz III J or L.

Fourth, German Note A4 is incorrect. It mentions that 4 Tigers were destroyed on July 11^th. This is not the case, as German strength returns for the division show only 1 damaged Tiger being placed in the Repair Pool on the 12^th. So, on the 11^th the LSSAH only suffered the loss of 1 Tiger off of "on-hand" status and it was a repairable one.

Fifth, German Note A5 is incorrect. The LSSAH did not have any StuH 42 assault guns during the Battle of Kursk. Although it contained the usual Sturmgeschutz Abteilung, it appears to have not been equipped with anything but StuG IIIG's.

Sixth, Note A10 is incorrect. The LSSAH did not have any SPW 251/16 Flamethrower halftracks during the Battle of Kursk.

Seventh, these and other inaccuracies add up to a German Reinforcement Group Chart that is significantly flawed. RG A1 should not be Pz IIIN but should be Pz III J or L. RG A5 should not allow a mix of StuG IIIG and StuH 42. RG A10 should not exist. RG A4, combined with the at-start Tiger platoon, allows players to field 9 Tigers. In reality, LSSAH only had 4 Tigers on-hand during July 11 and 3 on 12 (one was damaged and sent to the repair pool on the 11th). The last time the LSSAH was able to field 9 Tigers was on the opening day of the Kursk operation. The CG should give the player the at-start platoon and not have a Tiger RG available for purchase. Similar problems exist for the Pz IV RG. The maximum number of Pz IVs available to the player is 48 (combining purchases with the OB-given platoons). This is exactly the number the entire LSSAH division had operational. While technically not a problem, I find it surprising that the CG would want to represent every single Pz IV the division had ready for combat.

Eighth, the designation of the Soviet forces in the CG as "elite" is a mistake. While the parent formation of the 18^th and 29^th Tank Corps certainly was the 5^th Guards Tank Army, the 18^th and 29^th Corps were not the reasons for that designation. The 5^th Guards Mechanized Corps was the reason, and it didn't fight this battle (it was being saved for the eventual counter-offensive). Non-Guards units frequently were attached to Guards parent units, but this does not inherently make them elite. If they were elite, they would have the Guards designation themselves. In fact, the 18^th Tank Corps, 2^nd Tank Corps, and 2^nd Guards Tank Corps were all late-comers to the 5^th Guards Tank Army (the were attached on July 7, 11, and 11 respectively).

Ninth, the CG seems to have forgotten about the 9^th Guards Airborne Division. Given the large amount of infantry on both sides (after all, the LSSAH at the time was still a Panzergrenadier division, not a Panzer division), more infantry should be available, and more cheaply. Furthermore, an OB designation mistake is made when the CG card refers to the "5^th Guards Army, instead of the 5^th Guards Tank Army. The former was engaged in battle with the Totenkopf division west/northwest of LSSAH.

Tenth, there are mistakes and omissions in the Russian Reinforcement Group Chart. First, RG A4 should not exist. The 18^th Tank Corps did not have KV-1 tanks, and the 29^th Tank Corps had only one. Most likely this was a command tank. Second, RG's A6 and A7 should not be available. Although the authors of the CG note that their existence has not been proved, it's incredibly unlikely that any OT-34s or KV-8s fought against LSSAH. In fact even up beyond Army level to Front level, none of these tanks can be found in the listings for any Soviet unit anywhere on the southern part of the Kursk bulge. Third, since the 29^th Tank Corps had 12 SU-122s on-hand, there should be an RG for them. They most definitely were committed to the fight. On July 12, the second day of the battle, the "on-hand" number drops from 12 to 3, with 8 SU-122s showing up in the "destroyed and abandoned" list and 1 appearing on the damaged/under repair list. Fourth, starting on July 12^th, the 29^th Tank Corps is listed as having 11 SU-152s on-hand. Perhaps there should be a RG for them as well, although it's unclear if they actually were sent into battle (the on-hand number never changes, and none were ever destroyed or damaged through July 18^th). But they were there, ready to fight, so I suggest that the decision to use them be up to the player in the form of a RG.

Finally, the aftermath contains seveal errors. This is not a big deal since it doesn't effect the historical accuracy of the module, it does incorrectly color the battle. The aftermath makes references to "Panthers" even though none of the 3 SS divisions contained them. The 9^th Guards Division is the Airborne Division seemingly left out of the CG. There were no KV-1 tanks engaged so a Tiger could not have been rammed by one. Finally, the battles of the July 10 through July 14 were not a German defeat because of losses sustained by the three SS divisions. The records show that fewer than 100 tanks, SPG, and tank destroyers were "lost" by the three total, and even then nearly all of these were damaged AFV under repair. The three divisions lost few AFV as "destroyed and abandoned".

The key data on weapon availability, orders of battle, and force location and posture come from the Kursk Operation Simulation And Validation Exercise- Phase II (KOSAVE II) prepared by the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency in 1998. These data were supplemented with Tom Jentz's Panzertruppen vol 2, Schiffer Military Publishing, 1996.

Other sources that are excellent in terms of background information, force structure, and generally dispelling the myths of Kursk are:

David Glantz and Jonathan House. The Battle for Kursk, July-August 1943, Kansas University Press, 1999.

The Battle For Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study edited by David Glantz and Harold Orenstein, Frank Cass Publishing, 1999. Interesting because it's full of overstatements and outright lies, and the editors do their best job of correcting them. Sometimes, however, the editors do not correct a mistake until after it's been repeated several times. Do not read this book until you've read Glantz and House's book.

I also have read Mark Healy's Kursk 1943: The Tide Turns in the East which is part of Osprey's Campaign Series, and was first published in 1993. It's a good overview, with some interesting maps, but it has mistakes here and there and is completely wrong about the Battle of Prokhorovka. Healy should have picked up on the inconsistencies, since he presents reasonably accurate force totals for LSSAH early in his book, but later overstates those totals by a factor of six! Clearly, he was using Rotmistrov's account for the specifics of the fight at Prokhorovka and ignored his own evidence! Generally speaking, since complete data and archive material were not available until the mid-1990s, I personally wouldn't trust anything written on Kursk prior to 1997.

In the end, Tactiques' SP comes off as interesting but historically flawed. This was not an attempt on my part to denigrate their work; after all, they were working with the best research material at the time they designed the CG. This was also not an attempt to denigrate those who took the time and energy to translate the CG or those who's efforts made it available for free download. Rather, what I tried to do here was demonstrate the fact that "getting it right" can be very difficult. Hopefully I have also pointed out that using ASL, even HASL, as a history tool is flawed. I also feel that HASL designers should be required to include an exhaustive list of references consulted and be open to issuing revisions or errata to correct historical inaccuracies.

Email me about this page.

Back to my ASL page.